

Great Britain. Lords. House of
T H E *R 8/12/aa 2*
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L O R D S Protest

O N A

MOTION, That it is the Opinion of this House, that the continuing the Sixteen Thousand *Hanoverians* in the Pay of *Great Britain* is prejudicial to the true Interest of His Majesty, useless to the Common Cause, and dangerous to the Welfare and Tranquility of this Nation.

Die Martis 31 Januarij 1743.



L O N D O N :

Printed in the YEAR 1744.

FOR D^S PROTEST

ON A

MOTION, That it is the Opinion
of this House, that the continuing
the sixteen Thousand Horsemen
in the Pay of Great Britain is pre-
judicial to the true Interest of His
Majesty; useless to the Common
Cause, and dangerous to the Wel-
fare and Tranquillity of this Nation.



LONDON

Printed in the YEAR 1744



The Question was put upon the said Motion

T H E

L O R D S P R O T E S T.

Die Martis 31 Jannarij, 1743.

THE Order of the Day being read for taking into further Consideration the Estimate of the Charge of the Troops of *Hanover* in the Pay of *Great Britain*, from the 26th of *December* 1743, to the 25th of *December* 1744.

It was moved to resolve, That it is the Opinion of this House, that the continuing the Sixteen Thousand *Hanoverians* in the Pay of *Great Britain* is prejudicial to the true Interest of His Majesty, useless to the Common Cause, and dangerous to the Welfare and Tranquillity of this Nation.

And

And the same being objected to,

After a long Debate thereupon,

The Question was put upon the said Motion?

And it was resolved in the Negative.

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Dissentient

1. Because we conceive, that the Demand made in the Estimates for the Continuance of the 16000 *Hanoverians* in the Pay of *Great Britain* for the ensuing Year, rendered the Interposition of this House against so fatal a Measure the more necessary, inasmuch as it seemed now to be the only Means left to prevent it.

2. Because we apprehend, that every National Purpose, pretended to be answered by these *Hanoverians*, may be more effectually served by an equal Number of Troops, supposing such a Number to be necessary, free from the same Objections, either of other foreign Mercenaries, who will thereby be prevented from engaging with our Enemies (of

(of which the *Hanoverians*, when unpaid by us, cannot, we assure ourselves, be suspected) or, at least (which is evidently practicable, even at this Time) partly of Mercenaries, and partly out of the great and extraordinary Establishment of national Troops now in this Kingdom.

3. Because it appears to us, that these *Hanoverians*, tho' in the Pay, can hardly be said to have been in the Service of this Nation; some refused to form in the first Line at the Battle of *Dettingen*, and retired to the second; others refused to obey the Orders of the *British* General, and march in Pursuit of the Enemy after the Battle; and the greatest Number of 'em, who, together with some of the *British* Guards, composed what was called the Rear Guard, under the Command of a *Hanoverian* Lieutenant General, took a different Rout in the March from the rest of the Army from *Aschaffembourg*, and such a one as not only rendered them wholly useless to the Army, when the *French* attackt us in Front, but would have rendered them equally useless, if the *French* from *Aschaffembourg* (where we left the Passage open to them) had attackt us in the Rear, in which it was pretended that these Troops were left as in the Post of Honour: Nay, not contented to avoid
being

being of any Use, either in the Front or in the Rear, but determined to be of Use no where, they halted as soon as they came within Sight and Reach of the Battle, tho' pressed by the *British* Officer, and invited by the Ardour of the *British* Soldiers to share the Glory, and complete, as they might have done, the Victory of the Day. These Facts (together with many others which we omit) asserted in the Debate in Presence of many Lords of this House who served the last Campaign, denied by none of them, and confirmed in general by a noble Duke of the highest Rank and Character, prove (as we conceive) these Troops to be useless, at least if Action be intended; and we will not represent, even to ourselves what Reasons there can be for demanding them if Action be not intended.

4. Because, if as it was insinuated in the Debate, other Mercenaries could not be relied on, as belonging to Princes of the Empire, inclined to, or engaged with our Enemies, these *Hanoverians* would, as we conceive in Consequence, be useless to the Common Cause, since it would be in the Power of these very Princes, by only marching their Troops into proper Places, to recall these Mercenaries from us, and confine them to the Defence

Defence of their own Electorate, or disarm them at least by a second Neutrality.

5. Because it has not been pretended, that the Administration has so much as endeavoured to obtain any other foreign Troops whatsoever, notwithstanding the long Notoriety of the universal and deeply rooted Dissatisfaction of the Nation at the present Measure. A Neglect so unaccountable and surprizing to us, that we fear the Nation will rather suspect that we are to have no other Troops, than believe that no others are to be had.

6. Because we conceive, that the future Co-operation of our national Troops with these Mercenaries has been rendered impracticable, and even their Meeting dangerous; we think it, therefore, indispensably incumbent upon us to remove the Object that occasioned the many Instances of Partiality, by which the *Hanoverians* were unhappily distinguished, and our brave Fellow-Subjects, the *British* Forces, undeservedly discouraged. The constant Preference in Quarters, Forage, &c. we with no Occasion had been given to remember; but we cannot here pass over in Silence the *Hanoverian* Guards having for some Days done Duty upon his Majesty at *Aschaffenburg*, which we look upon as the highest Dishonour

to his Majesty and this Nation, and are therefore astonished to observe an unusual, and, to every other Purpose, useless Proportion of *Hanover* Guards continued upon the Estimate.

7. Because we apprehend, that the Argument urged in Opposition to this Question, namely, that the withdrawing these 16000 obnoxious Mercenaries would be weakening our Army in the next Campaign, alarm our Allies, and encourage our Enemies, is fully obviated by the Methods we have mentioned above of replacing them, some, if not all of which (notwithstanding the, to us, unaccountable Negligence of the Administration) are still undeniably practicable : Nor can we conceive, in any Case, that the removing the Causes of Discord and Division tends to the weakening of that Body from whence they are removed ; and we are of Opinion, that our Allies would not (whatever our Enemies might) regret the Loss of these Troops the next Year, which, by Experience, they found so useless the last.


8. Because we apprehend, that the most fatal Consequences must ensue, should this Nation be once possessed with an Opinion, that the Discouragements and Mortifications which our fellow Subjects of the Army have
received

received Abroad, were derived from any Distrust or Dislike of the *British* Nation; we are far from entertaining any such Opinion, tho' some Degree of foreign Partiality may have given indeed Occasion to these Discouragements and Mortifications; and tho' we cannot help ascribing 'em likewise to some abject Flattery and Criminal Misrepresentation, which this Partiality, blameless in itself, has unhappily given Occasion to, and by which, in its Turn, it has been fomented. But how groundless soever such an Opinion may be, it may still prevail, and the Appearances we lament, may produce the Effects we dread. The Motives to that Concern, that has been expressed in this House, and to the loud Dissatisfaction that has been expressed every where else, are in themselves of great Importance, and such as would deserve, even if they stood alone, the serious Consideration and seasonable Interposition of this House. But we confess, that they appear to us still more important, when we consider 'em relatively to Things of the same Nature, less apparent, indeed, but equally real and more detrimental, perhaps, if not more dishonourable to this Nation. For more dishonourable they may be thought, if a continued Principle of Conduct, whereby the Interests of one Country are carried on in Subordination

tion to those of another, constitutes the true and a mortifying Definition of a Province. We will not here call to Memory any former Measures of this Kind, nor recapitulate all the Instances that might be given, wherein the Blood and Treasure of this Nation have been lavishly employed, when no one *British* Interest, and (as we conceive) some foreign Interest alone was concerned. Some of these Instances were touched in the Debate, most of 'em are well known, and all of 'em are at this Time by the Course of Events manifested to publick View. The former were long hid and disguised under political Veils, the present could not by their Nature be so; they are such as strike every one equally, from the highest Officer to the common Soldier, and carry along with 'em not only their own Weight, but the Weight of all those that preceded 'em: They are such therefore, in our Opinions, as must affect, in the most fatal Manner, both the Peace and Security of His Majesty and his Royal Family, and the Common Cause in which we are now, and may hereafter be engaged. The present Royal Family was justly called to the Throne of *Great Britain* in order to secure to us our Civil and Religious Rights, and to remove every false and foreign Bias from our Administration. The Happiness and
Security

Security therefore both of King and People, consists in the inseparable Union of all these Interests, with the Interest of the Crown, in a just Confidence, that these National Views were those of the present Royal Family: This Nation has done every Thing that could engage 'em to adhere to 'em, and has given to his late and present Majesty, far greater Sums than were ever given in similar Circumstances, to any of their Royal Predecessors. Whoever goes about to sever the Interests of the Crown, from any National Interests, is an Enemy to both, and every Measure that does so, tends to destroy both. It is to guard against such Attempts that our Zeal for our King and Country exerts itself on this great Occasion, as our most earnest Desire is, That His Majesty's Throne should be established in the Hearts of his People; and as we are struck with Horror at every Object that can alienate his Affections from them, or theirs from him. How much these unfortunate Circumstances have already weakened the natural Influence of *Great Britain* in the Common Cause of *Europe*, is but too apparent in Fact, and could not be otherwise in the Nature of Things. *Great Britain* is a powerful Kingdom, and whenever she has acted in her true Character, and aimed at that great and noble View alone of maintaining

taining a Balance Between the Powers of Europe, for the common Interest of all, the Effects have been answerable to the Cause: And her Influence in *Germany* saved by her Arms, and supported by the Treasure in the last Wars, was, as it ought to be, and as it has been every where else superior; but should it ever appear, that an inferior *German* Principality is really, and *Great Britain* only nominally, the Director and Actor, such a Change in the Cause must necessarily produce a deplorable Difference in the Effect; and *Hanover*, that can give neither Strength nor Consideration to *Great Britain*, may thus diminish the one, and take the other wholly away.



Westmorland.

Sandwich.

Montjoy.

Dunk Halifax.

Gower.

Boyle.

Oxford & Mortimer.

Foley.

Huntingdon.

Ancaster, G. C.

Talbot.

Thanet.

Bridgewater.

Chesterfield.

Litchfield.

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Litchfield.

Hervey.

Strafford.

Stamford.

Shaftsbury.

Coventry.

Denbigh.

Ailesbury.

Bedford.

Abingdon.

Beaufort.



F I N I S.

Litchfield.